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HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA: MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS ON
MISTAKES OF LAW
ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Traditionally, the primary mechanism for enforc-
ing the Fourth Amendment has been the exclusionary rule. If a search
was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, any evidence of
the defendant's illegal conduct was excluded from the defendant's crimi-
nal trial. The main rationale for the exclusionary rule is that when evi-
dence is excluded, it deters police officers from future Fourth Amend-
ment violations.
After deterrence became the primary justification for the exclusion-
ary rule in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Calandra, declared that unless police officers can be deterred, the ex-
clusionary remedy serves no purpose whatsoever. In subsequent cases,
when police violated the Fourth Amendment, but acted reasonably in
"good faith," the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not ap-
ply because the officer could not be deterred. The Court has since ex-
panded the good-faith exception to an increasingly broad range of situa-
tions.
This Case Comment analyzes the Court's most recent expansion of
the good-faith exception in the context of police mistakes of law. Heien
v. North Carolina is the first Supreme Court case to hold that police of-
ficers who make (reasonable) mistakes of substantive law do not violate
the Fourth Amendment. In effect, the Court not only expanded the cir-
cumstances to which the good-faith exception applies, but also made
good faith an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirements, rather
than merely an exception to the exclusionary rule. Now, instead of decid-
ing whether the search or seizure was reasonable, as required by the
Fourth Amendment's text, the Court decides the convoluted metaquestion
of whether it was reasonable for a police officer to believe the search was
reasonable. This decision not only further erodes Fourth Amendment
protections and stunts the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine, but
also creates a perverse double standard for the criminal law maxim that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."
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INTRODUCTION
Early one morning in 2009, Maynor Vasquez and Nicholas Heien
were driving down a major interstate in North Carolina.' Vasquez was
driving, while Heien lay across the back seat.2 Meanwhile, Officer Matt
Darrisse sat on the side of the interstate watching traffic when he noticed
that Vasquez looked "stiff and nervous" as he drove by.3 Darisse pulled
onto the interstate and began to follow Vasquez's car.4 When Darisse
noticed that one of the rear brake lights was not working, he pulled
Vasquez over, mistakenly believing that state law required two working
brake lights.5 After giving Vasquez a citation, he got permission from
both men to search the car and subsequently found a bag of cocaine.6
Heien, who was the owner of the car, was sentenced to two years in pris-




5. Id at 534-35.
6. Id at 534.
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on for drug trafficking.7 He challenged the stop as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.8
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Heien v. North
Carolina9 to review the question of "[w]hether a police officer's mistake
of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires to justify a traffic stop."'0 In an 8-1 decision, the Court
held that "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government offi-
cials, giving them 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's
protection."'
This Case Comment argues that Heien was wrongly decided for a
number of reasons. First, it provides police officers with a legal justifica-
tion to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections and to stop drivers for
violating laws that do not actually exist. Second, the decision creates a
perverse double standard for the basic tenet that "ignorance of the law is
no excuse."l2 Police officers are now permitted to interpret vague laws in
individualized, "reasonable" ways, but citizens are still expected to know
and follow every law, regardless of how vague it is.'3 In other words,
citizens, most of whom have no legal education, are held to a higher
standard regarding knowledge of the criminal code than the very people
who are trained and entrusted to understand and enforce it.
Allowing an exception to the Fourth Amendment for police mis-
takes of law also seriously undermines the protections that the Fourth
Amendment provides individuals. The Fourth Amendment states: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no [wiarrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . . The Court
routinely analyzes criminal Fourth Amendment cases using three basic
steps.' First, there must be a search, meaning the person must have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy"' 6 or property interest7 in the area
7. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-5, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)
(No. 13-604).
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
10. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 1; see also Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
11. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 533, 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)).
12. Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687,
743 (2011) ("It is a hallmark of substantive criminal law that ignorance of the law is no defense.");
Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507,
509 (1986) (explaining that the rationale for this strict liability standard is that the refusal to reward
ignorance ensures "that the proper standard of conduct will be learned and respected by others").
13. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 536-40.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects "people, not places"); Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amend-
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searched. Second, the search must be reasonable, meaning the officer
must have had probable cause that the person was doing something ille-
gal.19 Third, if the search was unreasonable, the Court invokes the exclu-
sionary remedy, meaning that the jury is barred from considering evi-
dence of the defendant's illegal conduct that was obtained during the
search.20 The analysis in Heien comes in at the second step of this
framework because the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated if the officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake when
21interpreting the law.
Previous Supreme Court cases that analyze police officer's "good-
faith"2 2 mistakes in the context of searches and seizures focus on the
third step in the above framework2 3-whether the defendant should have
access to the exclusionary remedy.24 In these cases, the Court continually
ment's protection applies as long as the person had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area
searched).
17. In United States v. Jones, the Court considered whether the government's attachment of a
GPS device to a vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The Court explained that the govern-
ment's physical intrusion on an area, unlike an intrusion on an "effect," is of no Fourth Amendment
significance because there is no meaningful interference with an individual's possessory property
interests. Id. at 953.
18. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
19. See id. at 733, 751-54. Reasonableness comes in various forms in the different contexts of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Generally speaking, a search and seizure is unreasonable if it was
conducted without a warrant or if it was based on a warrant that was issued without probable cause.
See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 589, 595-98 (2014). In exigent circumstances, where obtaining a warrant would be
impractical, the officer can conduct a search as long as he has probable cause for believing that the
person committed a crime. Id. at 598-99. In the context of traffic stops, officers must have reasona-
ble suspicion to stop a driver. See id. at 624-25.
20. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733. The exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for criminal
Fourth Amendment cases. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the
Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237,
239-40. In civil cases there are a variety of remedies in addition to the exclusionary rule. See id. at
241-44. These mostly arise in the context of damages against individual government agents and
municipalities as well as injunctive or declaratory relief. See id
21. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
22. When police act reasonably, but violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court calls it "good-
faith." However, unlike the ordinary meaning of good faith, which refers to subjectively good inten-
tions, good faith in the context of the Fourth Amendment refers to whether the officer made an
objectively reasonable mistake. Sherry F. Colb, U.S. Supreme Court Considers Whether the Fourth
Amendment Allows Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law, VERDICT (May 5, 2014),
https:/verdict.justia.com/2014/05/05/supreme-court-considers-whether-fourth-amendment-allows-
reasonable-mistakes-substantive-law-2.
23. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138-39, 146-48 (2009) (holding that as
long as the officer is negligent in attenuating the arrest, he is acting in good faith, and the jury should
not be barred from considering all of the evidence); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3-4, 14 (1995)
(refusing exclusion when an officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had been issued for an indi-
vidual's arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-52, 359-60 (1987) (holding that the exclusion-
ary remedy is unavailable when legislators violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule is unavailable when judges violate
the Fourth Amendment).
24. There is one exception to this. Five years before the Court explicitly adopted the good-
faith exception in United States v. Leon, it decided Michigan v. DeFillippo, which essentially used
the good-faith justification to hold that an officer's reasonable reliance on a law that was later invali-
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held that the officers' mistakes did violate the Fourth Amendment; how-
ever, because the officers reasonably believed they had satisfied the
probable cause requirement (i.e., they acted in good faith), they did not
have mental states that could be deterred through legal sanctions. As
such, the supposed sole justification for the exclusionary rule did not
25
apply, and the evidence was admitted.
Heien essentially shifted the good-faith exception from a question
of remedy to a question of right. Consequently, the availability of the
Fourth Amendment's protections will no longer turn on whether the
search or seizure was reasonable, as the text of the Fourth Amendment
requires. Instead, the validity of a search or seizure will turn on the con-
voluted metaquestion of whether it is reasonable for the police officer to
believe the search was reasonable. This runs the risk of suppressing any
meaningful development of the Fourth Amendment because instead of
analyzing many of the critical and evolving aspects of reasonable search-
es and seizures, the Court will decide whether it was reasonable for the
officer to make a mistake about the relevant law.
In short, the Heien decision shows that the Court has not only ex-
panded the good-faith exception to include police mistakes of substantive
law, but also has begun to use the good-faith exception to limit the avail-
ability of the Fourth Amendment right, in addition to the Fourth
Amendment remedy. Expanding this exception both in degree and appli-
cation will cause the Fourth Amendment's general guarantee to be free
from unreasonable searches to only apply if the search involves egre-
gious officer conduct and obvious culpability.26 Over time, as remedies
fade from the Court's analyses, there will be less of a need to litigate
Fourth Amendment cases, and the doctrine will stagnate and lose its liv-
ing character.27 But most importantly, under Heien, if a law is unclear,
citizens are punished instead of the government.
Part I of this Case Comment will trace the emergence of deterrence
as the primary justification for the exclusionary remedy and show how
the Court's focus on officer culpability began the era of good-faith ex-
ceptions. It will then summarize the current state of the good-faith excep-
dated for void-for-vagueness grounds did not violate the Fourth Amendment itself. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979). Once the good-faith exception was expressly adopted in Leon, the Court only used it
to bar defendants' access to the exclusionary remedy. See id at 35-36, 39-40.
25. David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court's Contemporary Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (2013).
26. On the day Herring was decided, Tom Goldstein, a lawyer who has argued almost two-
dozen cases before the Supreme Court, blogged, "Today, the Supreme Court holds that negligent
errors by the police generally do not trigger the exclusionary rule.... Put another way, the Supreme
Court today extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct." Tom Goldstein, The
Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:32 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring/. Heien merely extends this
notion through the mistake of law exception.
27. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 732.
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tion to show how it has significantly eroded the exclusionary remedy and
paved a path for allowing police mistakes of law. Part II provides a brief
summary of the facts of Helen as well as the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes how Heien's extension of the good-
faith exception has narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amendment right
and precluded any discussion of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
remedy. Now, as long as the officer makes an objectively reasonable
mistake, the Fourth Amendment is nothing more than a holographic
promise that disappears when invoked.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment's Protections and the Importance of the Ex-
clusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule emerged as the primary remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations in Weeks v. United States.28 The Weeks Court
emphasized that a law enforcement officer's Fourth Amendment viola-
tions could not be approved by judges under any circumstances for two
key reasons.29 First, courts are bound by the duty to uphold the Constitu-
tion.30 Second, if personal property can be seized and "used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amend-
ment" to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures "is of no value,
and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution."31 The Court
emphasized that remedies define rights and that, without the exclusionary
rule, police officers have no incentive to refrain from conducting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.32 Additionally, the Court stressed that
judicial integrity would be threatened if Fourth Amendment violations
were approved by judicial decision. These foundational justifications
made up the backbone of the Fourth Amendment, and in effect, what was
reasonable was narrowly construed in all contexts, making the exclusion-
ary rule a natural adjunct to Fourth Amendment violations.34 However, at
the time Weeks was decided, the Fourth Amendment only applied to fed-
28. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Weeks, a feder-
al marshal entered the defendant's house without a warrant and seized papers that were later admit-
ted in trial as proof of the defendant's lottery crimes. Id. at 388-89. The Court held that the evidence
should be excluded because the seizure violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at
398.
29. See id at 393-94.
30. Id. at 393 ("The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established be
[sic] years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.").
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 394.
34. See Gray, supra note 25, at 14-15.
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eral officers because the Bill of Rights had not yet been extended to the
states.35
It was not until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,36 that the Court incorpo-
rated the Fourth Amendment to the states.37 The majority opinion in Wolf
emphasized that the exclusionary rule is both an individual remedy to the
person whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated as well as a
general deterrent aimed at law enforcement officers.38 Nevertheless, the
Court declined to extend application of the exclusionary rule because it
decided that it would be best for states to fashion their own remedies to
Fourth Amendment violations.9 However, in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,40
the Court incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states when it con-
firmed that other remedies had proved to be "worthless and futile" when
it came to punishing and deterring law enforcement misconduct.41 The
Court also emphasized that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment and that failing
to require exclusion when law enforcement agents violate the Fourth
Amendment would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment."4 2
In addition to providing a framework for the expansion of the exclu-
sionary rule's application, Weeks, Wolf and Mapp demonstrate that de-
terring police officers was initially viewed as only a partial justification
for exclusion that helped strengthen its application rather than fully sup-
port it. 43 However, starting in the 1960s, deterrence began to emerge as
the exclusionary rule's most important justification."" In Elkins v. United
States,45 Justice Stewart explicitly stated that the exclusionary rule's
"purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it."46 Eventually, in United States v. Calandra47 the Court declined
35. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 700-01.
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. Id. at 27-28, 33.
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. Id. at 31-33.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. Id. at 651-53, 657-58.
42. Id. at 655-56.
43. See id. at 659 (explaining that judicial integrity is another imperative consideration of the
exclusionary rule); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More Majestic Conception":
The Importance ofJudicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47,
47, 53 (2010) ("Judicial integrity was the original reason for adopting the exclusionary rule in the
Supreme Court case of Weeks v. United States . . . ."); Gray, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing how in
Wolf v. Colorado "the Court had fully embraced punishment and deterrence as partial justifications
of the exclusionary rule").
44. See Gray, supra note 25, at 17-18.
45. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
46. Id. at 217. Elkins barred use of the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, which allowed
federal prosecutors to avoid the exclusionary rule remedy by encouraging state officers to unlawfully
obtain evidence on their behalf. Id. at 208. The Court emphasized the importance of preventing
529
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to recognize any justification for the exclusionary rule other than deter-
ring law enforcement officers.48 Significantly, Calandra marked the shift
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from using deterrence as a justifica-
tion for invoking the exclusionary remedy to a justification for barring
application of the exclusionary remedy.49 The Court accomplished this
by setting forth the notion that if the exclusionary rule does not have the
effect of deterring the police officer, it has no purpose whatsoever.o This
shift acted as a catalyst for allowing the Court to use a theory of police
culpability and punishment to guide its practices.5 But the difficulty in
proving that an officer's mistake was objectively unreasonable has creat-
ed an increasing number of ever-expanding good-faith exceptions that
have been slowly reshaping the exclusionary remedy's role in Fourth
Amendment criminal procedure.5 2
B. The Expansion of the Good-Faith Exception
The most important exception that stemmed from using deterrence
to bar exclusion came up in United States v. Leon.53 There the Court es-
tablished that when an officer violates the Fourth Amendment, but rea-
sonably believes that he has satisfied the legal probable cause standard,
he is acting in good faith.54 Accordingly, because the officer did not have
a mental state that could be deterred, evidence of the defendant's illegal
conduct was not suppressed. In Leon, police officers obtained a search
warrant to enter Leon's residence and subsequently found a large quanti-
56
ty of illegal drugs. Later, the warrant was held to have been invalid
because it was issued without probable cause.57 The Court initially at-
tempted to make Leon's holding a narrow exception by only applying it
to excuse an officer's reasonable reliance on a warrant that was later in-
validated.58 However, over time, the Court began to routinely rely on
Leon's reasoning-the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and
courts from serving as "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold." Id at 223.
47. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
48. Id. at 347. Calandra held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury investiga-
tions. Id. at 351-52. The Court explained that it is unlikely that police would carry out an unlawful
search and seizure in an effort to gather information to ask questions at a grand jury proceeding and
as such, applying the exclusionary rule in such cases would not deter police misconduct. Id
49. See Gray, supra note 25, at 20.
50. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350-52. According to the Calandra Court, the exclusionary
rule was nothing more than a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." Id. at 348.
51. See Gray, supra note 25, at 22-23.
52. See Bloom & Fentin, supra note 43, at 57-59; see also Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
53. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
54. Id. at 913.
55. See id at 923-24.
56. Id. at 901-02.
57. Id. at 903-04.
58. Marceau, supra note 12, at 739.
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should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity"59-as a basis for expanding the good-faith exception.so
In 2009, in Herring v. United States,61 the Court held that an of-
ficer's good-faith reliance on a clerk's mistake would also preclude ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule because at the time of the search, the
officer reasonably believed he had satisfied the necessary probable cause
62requirement. Significantly, the Herring Court created a new standard
for invoking the good-faith exception by explaining that as long as the
officer was merely negligent in conducting a search or seizure, he does
not have a mental state that can be deterred, and thus, the jury should not
be barred from considering all the evidence.63 However, the notion that
punishing negligent behavior cannot be deterred through sanctions runs
completely contrary to our entire system of tort law.M Indeed, as Justice
Ginsberg pointed out in her dissent, almost all of tort law is based on the
premise that liability for negligence incentivizes people to act with great-
65er care.
Herring also directly contradicted almost all of the Supreme Court's
exclusionary-remedy precedent by stating, "exclusion 'has always been
our last resort, not our first impulse."'6 6 Going forward, the Court shifted
away from viewing the exclusionary rule as a natural adjunct to a Fourth
Amendment violation and started viewing it as an extraordinary step that
should only be used in cases involving flagrant police misconduct.67
Two years later, the good-faith rationale was extended by Davis v.
United States,8 which held that an officer's reasonable reliance on a
binding appellate precedent, which was later overruled by a Supreme
59. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
60. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-28 (2011); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-44 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-12, 14 (1995); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-51 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-91 (1984).
61. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
62. Id. at 144-46; see also Kamin & Marceau, supro note 19, at 591 (explaining that a search
can be sufficiently unreasonable to violate the defendant's right, but not so unreasonable that he
should have access to the exclusionary remedy).
63. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 147-48.
64. Id. at 153 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule, the Court suggests, is capable
of only marginal deterrence when the misconduct at issue is merely careless, not intentional or
reckless. The suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law-that liability for negli-
gence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater care." (citation omitted)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 140 (majority opinion) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006));
see also id. at 137 ("Our cases establish that such suppression is not an automatic consequence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.").
67. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 19, at 618 ("[T]he exclusionary rule now requires a
fact-specific inquiry into the culpability of the officer, and where an officer was acting reasonably,
even when the Fourth Amendment was violated, exclusion is not permitted.").
68. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011).
53 1
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Court case, does not trigger application of the exclusionary rule.69 Once
again, the Court analyzed whether the police officer acted in good faith
and subsequently held that the seizure was sufficiently unreasonable to
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right, but because the officers
were acting reasonably, there was no justification for the exclusionary
remedy.70
C. The Emergence of Police Mistakes ofLaw
The Court also used the good-faith exception to broaden related ex-
ceptions like mistake of fact and mistake of law. Mistake of fact has
long been viewed as insufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule because
probable cause and reasonable suspicion do not require meticulous accu-
racy.72 However, unlike mistake of fact, mistake of law has historically
never served as an exception to the exclusionary rule because it contra-
dicts the most important maxim of substantive criminal law: ignorance of
the law is no excuse. The rationale behind a strict liability standard for
mistake of law is that refusing to reward ignorance will encourage citi-
zens and law enforcement alike to learn and respect the law.74 However,
after Herring, some courts75 began to acknowledge that, in certain cir-
69. Id. at 2428-29. In Davis, police officers conducted a traffic stop and arrested the defend-
ant for giving a false name. Id. at 2425. They subsequently searched his car and found a gun. Id The
Court held that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because the officer acted in objec-
tively reasonable good faith. Id. at 2428-29.
70. Id.
71. Gray, supra note 25, at 38-40; Marceau, supra note 12, at 742-54.
72. Marceau, supra note 12, at 742-43 (explaining that lower courts have historically
acknowledged that he maxim has no less force in the context of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule: "Even a good faith mistake of law by an officer cannot form the basis for reason-
able suspicion, because 'there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do
not act in accordance with governing law."' (quoting United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739
(2001))).
73. See id. at 743-44; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Term Paper, Herring v. United States: A
Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 488-89 (2009).
74. See Gray, supra note 25, at 43; Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J.
69, 91 (2011) ("Reciprocal expectations of law-abidingness between government and citizens can
scarcely be expected to endure if one party-the government-need not uphold its end of the bar-
gain." (footnote omitted)).
75. In 2005, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Court to hold, in United States
v. Martin, that police can make objectively reasonable mistakes of law. 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005).
The officer pulled over a Native American driver because he only had one working light and subse-
quently discovered that Martin had a pound of marijuana in the car. Id. at 1000. It was undisputed
that the officer mistakenly understood the Motor Vehicle Code to require two working brake lights,
when it actually only required one. See id. However, the Court held that the search and seizure did
not violate the Fourth Amendment and explained that "the validity of a stop depends on whether the
officers actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question
is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact, was an objectively reasonable one." Id at
1001; see also Logan, supra note 74, at 80-81 (discussing how, in addition to the Eighth Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit, as well as the state appellate courts in Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, and South Dakota
have condoned what they consider to be reasonable mistakes of law).
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cumstances, mistakes of law bar exclusion because of the good-faith
exception.76
Herring's effect on subsequent cases involving police mistakes be-
gan a new phase of limiting the use of the exclusionary rule to instances
where law enforcement officers have knowledge that their conduct is
unconstitutional. If the officer lacks knowledge that his conduct is un-
constitutional, there is no way to deter him, and therefore, his conduct is
reasonable.78 Under this approach, the blamelessness of a law enforce-
ment officer, not a Fourth Amendment violation, determines the availa-
bility of exclusion.79 Heien essentially moved the good-faith justification
outlined in Herring from a question of remedy to a question of right by
holding that as long as the officer's basis for probable cause is based on
an "objectively reasonable" mistake of the law, there is no Fourth
Amendment violation in the first place.80
Police mistakes of law can be divided into three broad categories.
The first category concerns whether a law that was invoked by a police
officer as a basis for an arrest, but later found unconstitutional, violates
82 8the Fourth Amendment. In Michigan v. DeFillippo,8 3 the Court held
that the search was still reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because law enforcement should not be required to antici-
pate that a court would later overturn particular laws.84 However, exclu-
sion is still available when the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly un-
constitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to
see its flaws."85
The second category involves mistakes that relate to Fourth
Amendment procedure, such as when a warrant is required and what
76. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 745 ("There is a sense that Herring has ushered in, despite
protestations by the Court to the contrary, an era of exclusion that is markedly more focused on the
culpability of the officer-in assessing the deterrence benefit of the exclusionary rule, the relative
culpability of the offending officer has moved to the forefront of the remedial analysis.").
77. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[E]vidence
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment." (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144-46 (2009))).
78. Marceau, supra note 12, at 745.
79. Id.
80. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539-40 (2014).
81. Marceau, supra note 12, at 744-45.
82. Logan, supra note 74, at 76.
83. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). In DeFillippo, a Detroit city ordinance authorized police to stop and
question individuals if they had probable cause that the person was doing something illegal. Id. at
33. Officers found DeFillippo in an alley with a woman who was in the process of lowering her
slacks. Id. When asked for identification, DeFillippo gave inconsistent and evasive responses. Id. He
was subsequently arrested and searched, and the police found illegal drugs. Id. at 34. The ordinance
was later invalidated on void-for-vagueness grounds. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id at 38.
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level of suspicion86 is required for a warrantless stop or arrest.87 In these
circumstances, the mistake involves the application of the Fourth
Amendment itself, as opposed to an extrinsic law.88 For example, in
Stoner v. California,89 the police searched the petitioner's hotel room
without a warrant and without consent from the petitioner.90 Instead, they
obtained permission from the hotel's night-desk clerk.91 The Court unan-
imously held that the search was unreasonable because the police did not
have a warrant.9 2 As such, evidence found in the hotel room was exclud-
ed.93
The third category of police mistakes of law involves misinterpreta-
tions of settled law.94 In these situations, courts analyze the reasonable-
ness of an officer's interpretation of the law, which now hinges on
whether the officer acted in good faith and whether his behavior is some-
thing that can be deterred.95 Police mistakes of substantive law have re-
mained one of the last circumstances where the good-faith exception
does not apply and where a defendant can realistically rely on the exclu-
96sionary remedy. However, Heien v. North Carolina closed in this gap
by holding that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law pro-
vides the necessary reasonable suspicion to preclude any application of
the Fourth Amendment's protections.97 In effect, ignorance of the law is
an excuse.
II. HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA
A. Facts
In April 2010, a North Carolina policeman named Sargent Matt
Darisse sat in his patrol car observing traffic on a major interstate.9 8 Dar-
86. Reasonable suspicion is a standard used in criminal procedure that is less stringent than
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is sufficient to satisfy brief stops and detentions, but it is not
enough to justify a full search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) (holding that a brief stop is
only valid if the officers have an objectively reasonable suspicion to believe that a law is being
violated).
87. Logan, supra note 74, at 77.
88. See id.
89. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
90. Id. at 484-85.
91. Id. at 485.
92. Id. at 490.
93. Id.
94. Marceau, supra note 12, at 744.
95. Logan, supra note 74, at 78-79. There is a fear that, after Herring, courts will begin to
hold that as long as the police officer was negligent in making the arrest, the behavior is reasonable,
and the Fourth Amendment's protections barred. Marceau, supra note 12, at 741 ("[T]here is a
palpable fear that the 'sweeping language' from [Herring) will be used to establish an understanding
of the good faith exception as 'a general exception to exclusion for negligent-rather than reckless
or deliberate-police misconduct."' (quoting I. Fourth Amendment -- Exclusionary Rule, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 153, 157 (2009))).
96. See Logan, supra note 74, at 79.
97. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
98. Id at 534.
534 [Vol. 93:2
2016] MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS ON MISTAKES OF LAW
isse noticed that the driver of a passing car looked "stiff and nervous," so
he started following in his car.99 After following for several miles, Dar-
isse noticed that only one of the brake lights of the car was working, so
he pulled the driver over. 1 When he asked the driver of the car, Maynor
Javier Vasquez, for his license and registration, he noticed that the owner
of the car, Nicholas Brady Heien, was lying across the rear seat.10 There
were no problems with the documents, and Darisse issued a warning
ticket.102 However, Darisse became suspicious when the two men gave
inconsistent answers about their destination and acted nervous.10 3
Vasquez and Heien answered further questions, and when Darisse asked
whether he could search the car, the men consented.'1 After a thorough
search of the car, Darisse found a sandwich bag that contained cocaine,
and both men were arrested.05
B. Procedural History
The trial court denied Heien's motion to suppress the evidence and
concluded that the faulty brake light gave Darisse reasonable suspicion to
stop the vehicle.'1 "Heien pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal
the suppression decision."'07 The North Carolina Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the stop was invalid "because driving with only one.
. . brake light was not [technically] a violation of North Carolina law." 08
The relevant provision of the vehicle code states that a car must be
"equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle,"'0 9 and it was un-
disputed that Heien had one working brake light. The State appealed, and
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and concluded that Darisse
could have reasonably read the statute to require that both brake lights
need to be in working order." l0 The case was remanded to the North Car-








106. Id. at 535.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Section 20-129(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides in relevant part: "Rear
Lamps. -- Every motor vehicle ... shall have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in
good working order. . . ." Subsection (g) provides:
No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State any motor vehicle, motorcy-
cle or motor-driven cycle, manufactured after December 31, 1955, unless it shall be
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop lamp shall display a red or
amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight,
and shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be
incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-129(d), (g) (2009).
110. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
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motion to suppress.' The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to re-
view the question of "[w]hether a police officer's mistake of law can
provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires
to justify a traffic stop."ll2
C. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsberg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined." 3
The opinion affirmed the state court's ruling that reasonable suspicion
can rest on a mistake of law.114 Justice Roberts began by emphasizing
that the Court has long held that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is 'reasonableness.""15 However, "[t]o be reasonable is not
to be perfect," and therefore, the Fourth Amendment allows some mis-
takes on behalf of law enforcement officers."'6 The opinion stressed that
the limiting factor is that "the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men."' 17
Justice Roberts then delved into justifying mistakes of substantive
law by explaining that a reasonable person can confuse the law just as
much as he could confuse the facts, and both are equally compatible with
the concept of reasonable suspicion."8 Indeed, to justify this type of sei-
zure, officers only need reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause.119 Reasonable suspicion, the Court explained, is defined as "a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped" broke the law.' 2 0 The Court went on to explain that reasonable
suspicion arises from both "an officer's understanding of the facts and
his understanding of the relevant law."'21 After mentioning that there are
no recent precedents that address substantive mistakes of law in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment, the opinion stressed that the concept has
appeared in numerous cases since the early 1800s.12 2 It also recognized
that there were no cases that were directly on point but explained a con-
trary conclusion would be difficult to reconcile with DeFillippo, which
held that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if government searches
are based on statutes that are later declared unconstitutional.123
111. Id.
112. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-
604), 2014 WL 2601475, at *1.
113. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 533.
114. Id. at 534.
115. Id. at 536 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-88 (2014)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536-37.
123. Id. at 537-38.
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Justice Roberts then rejected Heien's argument that DeFillippo was
a case solely about the exclusionary rule by explaining that DeFillippo's
marginal discussion24 of the exclusionary rule does not displace the
holding that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.125 It then
drew a parallel to Heien by explaining that "there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment" because the officer's mistake about whether both
brake lights were required by the vehicle code was reasonable.126 Heien's
second argument attacked the notion that the Fourth Amendment's toler-
ance of mistake of fact should extend to mistake of law because mistake
of law is plainly a question of the officer's knowledge rather than a
judgment the officer made on the fly while working in the field.12 7 JUS-
tice Roberts addressed this argument by pointing out that an officer may
suddenly confront a situation in the field where the statute is unclear,
which makes mistake of law and mistake of fact one category that hinges
on reasonableness, rather than two separate categories.'28 The opinion
also rejected the suggestion that the decision would discourage police
from learning the law because the mistake must still be "objectively rea-
sonable." 29
The last major point that the Court addressed was that ignorance of
the law is still no excuse.'3 0 In cases like this one, police are trying to
implement the Fourth Amendment, not break the law.131 Thus, when law
enforcement officers reasonably believe that others have broken the law,
they may stop them to investigate without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.13 2
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsberg joined, agreed with the
majority opinion that the "'Fourth Amendment tolerates only . .. objec-
tively reasonable mistakes of law."'1 33 Justice Kagan's first main point
was that an officer's subjective understanding is irrelevant and that the
government cannot defend the officer using mistake of law if the officer
was unaware or untrained in the law.' 34 Her second point was that "if [a]
statute is genuinely ambiguous," then the mistake is reasonable.35 If the
statute is not genuinely ambiguous, the statute must be "really difficult"
124. The Court pointed out that in DeFillippo, the Court stated in a footnote that that suppres-
sion of the evidence found on DeFillippo would serve none of the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 538.
125. Id.




130. Id. at 540.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Id. at 539 (majority opinion) (alteration in original)).




to understand or a "very hard question of statutory interpretation."' 36 The
opinion concluded by speculating that the vehicle code posed a difficult
question of interpretation because it had conflicting signals as to whether
the brake light requirement was to be taken in the singular or plural.137
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by agreeing with the majority
opinion that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'rea-
sonableness."'l38 However, she promptly pointed out that "a fixed legal
yardstick" would make it easier to administer this notion rather than a
vague standard of reasonable legal mistakes.'39 She emphasized that the
state of the law should always trump an individual's misunderstanding of
the law because, unlike facts, the meaning of the law is not indefinite.14 0
As such, it is a court's job to interpret the law, not a police officer's.141
She also pointed out that permitting mistakes of law to justify seizures
has the effect of preventing the clarification of the law because courts no
longer need to clarify laws through decisions; they merely need to decide
if the officer's interpretation was reasonable.14 2 Additionally, Justice
Sotomayor pointed out that DeFillippo was not a case about mistake of
law at all because it simply concerned the validity of a law.143 Thus, the
Court was wrong in justifying the decision in Heien using DeFillippo.'44
She concluded by explaining that she would hold that "an officer's mis-
take of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot support he individualized
suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."45
III. ANALYSIS
The Heien decision further erodes the general guarantee to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures because it allows police to en-
force nonexistent laws without violating the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
as long as a police officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake (i.e.,
he is acting in good faith), when interpreting and enforcing the law, it is
the citizen who is punished instead of the government. Expanding the
good-faith exception in this way not only limits the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right, but also expands the factual scenarios where the Court
will preclude any discussion of the exclusionary remedy.
136. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530
(2014) (No. 13-604)).
137. Id at 541-42.
138. Id. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 542-43.
141. Id. at 543.
142. Id. at 542-43.
143. Id. at 546.
144. See id. at 546-47.
145. Id. at 547.
538 [Vol. 93:2
2016] MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS ON MISTAKES OF LAW
The following analysis proceeds in three main sections. Section A
will discuss how the Court accomplished this expansion. Section A. 1 will
show how the Court broadened the holding in DeFillippo to justify al-
lowing police mistakes of law, and Section A.2 will show how the Court
combined police mistakes of law and mistakes of fact into one category.
Section B will show how Heien's expansion of the good-faith exception
is procedurally eroding the Fourth Amendment and stunting the devel-
opment of the Fourth Amendment's doctrine. Section C will discuss the
implications of allowing police to make mistakes of substantive law.
Section C.1 will show how the expansion of police discretion will dis-
proportionately impact minorities, and Section C.2 will show how allow-
ing police mistakes of law threatens judicial integrity, undermines the
expectation that the law is "definite and knowable," and disincentivizes
legislators to make laws that are clear and concise.
A. The Unlimited Scope of Reasonable Mistakes ofLaw
Since the Court first started making good-faith exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule, it has struggled to find a way to limit each exception to a
narrow range of circumstances.146 As a result, all of the exceptions have
followed a trend of expanding to encompass an increasingly broad range
of situations.147 Heien is unique in the expansion of the good-faith excep-
tion because it not only gives police officers a legal justification to use a
nonexistent law to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections, but also
contradicts the most important maxim of substantive criminal aw that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."1 48 The Court accomplished this dis-
turbing expansion in two significant ways. First, it broadened the holding
in DeFillippo to justify allowing a law enforcement officer to make a
reasonable mistake of substantive law. Second, the Court erased the dif-
ferences between mistake of law and mistake of fact by combining them
into one broad category.14 9 Now, as long as the officer makes an objec-
tively reasonable mistake, the Fourth Amendment is nothing more than a
holographic protection that disappears when invoked.
146. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
147. See id.
148. Notably, Heien argued that because the maxim ignorance of the law is no excuse applies
to citizens who break the law, it should also apply to police. In the majority opinion, the Court re-
sponded to this argument by explaining that ignorance of the law does not apply because Heien "is
not appealing a brake light ticket; he is appealing a cocaine-trafficking conviction as to which there
is no asserted mistake of fact or law." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. But the ultimate effect of this deci-
sion is that the Court no longer holds police officers accountable to knowing and abiding by the rule
of law. The phrases "reasonable mistake of law" and "ignorance of the law" essentially mean the
same thing. See Alschuler, supra note 73, at 488-89 (explaining that the good-faith exception in
Leon weakens the exclusionary rule because it undermined the familiar rule of strict liability: igno-
rance of the law is no excuse).
149. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536-37.
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1. The Vague Limit on Objectively Reasonable Mistakes
Throughout the past decade, the Court has made a routine of using
search and seizure precedents in a way that ignores any limitations on
good-faith exceptions yet bolsters the notion that, if the police officer
acted reasonably, deterrence cannot be achieved.150 The source of this
problem dates back to Leon, which was initially intended to limit the
good-faith exception to situations that involve an officer's reasonable
reliance on a warrant that is later invalidated.'5 1 However, in subsequent
cases,152 the Court refused to acknowledge that the good-faith exception
only applies to invalidated warrants and simply explained that if the of-
ficer reasonably believes he has satisfied the probable cause requirement,
the exclusionary rule serves no purpose whatsoever.153
The Court used the same tactic in Heien to expand DeFillippo's
mistake of law limitations. In Heien the Court's central justification for
expanding the good-faith exception to include mistakes of substantive
law was that a contrary ruling would contradict the Court's holding in
DeFillippo.154 However, DeFillippo was intended to set precedent only
in circumstances where the law enforcement officer relied on a law that
was later deemed unconstitutional.155 In contrast, Heien had nothing to
do with a law that was later deemed unconstitutional. It involved a police
officer's interpretation of an ambiguous law and whether his interpreta-
tion was reasonable.15 6 Yet, instead of limiting DeFillippo's narrow rul-
ing by recognizing that it does not overlap with the facts of Heien, the
Court justified allowing police mistakes of substantive law by implying
that, in both cases, the officers acted reasonably.157
Moreover, instead of providing a clear standard to limit the scope of
reasonable mistakes, the Court provided an extremely vague and expan-
sive standard by stating that the only "limit is that 'the mistakes must be
those of reasonable men.""58 In essence, it remains entirely unclear how
much law a reasonable police officer is supposed to know. Do reasonable
police officers know the most recent Supreme Court cases interpreting
the laws? Are police officers acting reasonably if they simply follow the
150. See Gray, supra note 25, at 19-22 (discussing the Court's contemporary deterrence-only
approach).
151. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).
152. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138-39 (2009) (holding that as long as the officer
is negligent in attenuating the arrest, he is acting in good faith, and the jury should not be barred
from considering all of the evidence); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1995) (refusing exclu-
sion when an officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had issued for an individual's arrest); Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary remedy is unavailable when legis-
lators violate the Fourth Amendment.).
153. See Gray, supra note 25, at 39-41.
154. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 538-39.
155. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39 (1979).
156. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
157. See id. at 538-39.
158. Id. at 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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text of the statutes as they appear on their computers, or do they need to
continue to study the laws? Is a police officer still acting reasonably if
she bases her decisions on what she was taught in police academy but
does not actually know what the law says? In Heien, it seems likely that
the police officer may have never read the statute concerning brake lights
and that he may have just assumed that driving with only one working
brake light violated the law. Later in the opinion, Justice Roberts ex-
plained that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if the mistake of
law simply relates to the question of "whether it was reasonable for an
officer to suspect that he defendant's conduct was illegal."159 Thus, as
long as the officer has an inkling of suspicion that a person is doing
something illegal, he can circumvent the Fourth Amendment to find out.
2. Reasonable Mistakes of Law Are Inherently Different from Rea-
sonable Mistakes of Fact
In addition to using precedent as a justification for expanding the
mistake of law exception, the Court also expanded the breadth of reason-
able mistakes by combining mistake of law and mistake of fact into one
category.o6 0 The Court prefaced this notion when it explained that to be
"reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for
some mistakes."l6 1 It went on to explain that reasonable mistakes of law
and fact are equally compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion
because reasonable suspicion "arises from the combination of an of-
ficer's understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant
law."' 62 However, the ultimate effect of expanding police mistakes to
include all mistakes of law is that it causes the existence of the Fourth
Amendment to be entirely dependent on the reasonableness of the of-
ficer's understanding of the law.
There are important practical distinctions that the Court ignored
when it combined mistakes of law and fact. First, officers have always
had some leeway in making probable-cause determinations because fac-
tual scenarios are almost always somewhat ambiguous.'63 As Justice So-
tomayor pointed out, "what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations ... is not that they always be correct, but that they always
be reasonable." 164 This leeway makes sense considering that an officer's
understanding of the facts is often a combination of quick observations
159. Id. at 539.
160. See id at 536.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 542-43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 543 (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)).
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and assessments of human behavior.s In contrast, interpretation of the
law does not require human behavior observations or inquiry.'
66
Furthermore, officers are often expected to make factual determina-
tions under time pressure, especially in the context of traffic stops.167 The
Court has taken this into consideration by explaining that "[t]he calculus
of reasonableness must" take into account "the fact that police officers . .
. often [need] to make split-second judgments" in situations that are tense
and unpredictable.6 8 In contrast, officers are not under time pressure to
learn the law while on patrol duty.169 Rather, police officers should know
and understand the law before they are given a duty to enforce it. Con-
sidering the advancements in police training and technology, it is ex-
tremely unfair for the Court to pronounce that police do not have to
know every facet of the law, but citizens do.' 70 The absurdity of this ap-
proach becomes even more apparent when one considers that when a
police officer is off duty, and is driving as a citizen, he has a duty to
know every nuance of the law, but as soon as he puts on his uniform and
badge, he has no such duty. In sum, trying to figure out what the law
entails is not something that should involve spur-of-the-moment deci-
sion-making; rather, it is a function of prior training, practice, and vari-
ous forms of technology. Indeed, the notion that the law is "definite and
knowable" is at the core of our legal system.'7 '
Justice Sotomayor addressed this in her dissent by explaining that
the Court has always emphasized that the facts leading up to the search,
in combination with the law, are what provide a basis for probable
cause-"not an officer's conception of the rule of law," and certainly not
an officer's reasonable misunderstanding about the law." 72 She went on
to emphasize that there is "scarcely a peep" in the history of the Fourth
Amendment suggesting that an officer's understanding of the law is in-
tended to factor into the reasonableness metric.'73 In fact, Heien contra-
dicts the long line of precedents explaining that the principle components
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause have always been an officer's
assessment of the facts weighed against rule of law, not an officer's as-
165. Id. at 542-43.
166. Id. at 543.
167. Id.
168. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (discussing the scope of reasonableness
in the context of police stops).
169. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Logan, supra note 74, at 84 (discussing how the argument that laws are too voluminous
and complex is "especially unjustified given unprecedented improvements in the educational back-
grounds of police and ready access to substantive law, including via dashboard computers").
171. Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); cf Logan, supra note 74, at 83 ("The
expectation that the law be 'definite and knowable' is no more tenable for police today than it is for
the lay public." (footnote omitted)).
172. Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 543.
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sessment of the law.174 Ultimately, the effect of combining mistakes of
law and fact into one category is that the availability of Fourth Amend-
ment protections now hinge on the reasonableness of the officer's
knowledge and understanding of the law.
B. Eliminating Discussion of the Exclusionary Remedy Will Stunt Mean-
ingful Development of the Fourth Amendment
Other Supreme Court cases that discuss police officers' mistakes in
the context of searches and seizures hold that the mistakes violate the
Fourth Amendment right; however, because the officer acted reasonably,
there is no justification for the exclusionary remedy.'7 5 In contrast, the
Heien Court discussed the police officer's legal error in the context of the
scope of the right, thereby precluding any discussion of the exclusionary
remedy. 76 Over time, this approach runs the risk of limiting any mean-
ingful development of the Fourth Amendment because, instead of decid-
ing whether the search and seizure was reasonable, the Court decides
whether it was reasonable for the officer to make a mistake about the
relevant law. As remedies fade from the Court's analyses, there will be
less of a need to litigate Fourth Amendment cases, and the doctrine will
stagnate and lose its living character.'7 7 In short, Heien demonstrates that
the Court is much more concerned with short-term implications of officer
culpability and deterrence than the long-term development of the Fourth
Amendment.
174. See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (explaining that an arresting
officer's state of mind does not factor into the probable-cause inquiry, "except for the facts that he
knows" (emphasis added)); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (explaining that the
principal components of probable cause are "the events which occurred leading up to the stop or
search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objec-
tively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause"); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) ("[W]hat is generally demanded of the many factual determi-
nations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be
correct, but that they always be reasonable." (emphasis added)); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) ("[T]he issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or con-
stitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (framing the question as to
whether the "facts" give rise to reasonable suspicion).
175. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule is not invoked when the officer acts in good faith but is simply negligent in making an
arrest); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule when an
officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had issued for an individual's arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 349 (1987) (extending the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule to cover cases in
which police carry out a search or seizure pursuant to the authority of a statute that a court later
determines violates the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (creat-
ing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a warrant is issued by a "detached and
neutral" judge). The only other case to hold that an officer's legal error did not violate the Fourth
Amendment right was Michigan v. DeFillippo, which held that an officer's reliance on a law that
was later invalidated for void-for-vagueness grounds did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 443
U.S. 31, 39-40 (1979).
176. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536-40.
177. Marceau, supra note 12, at 731.
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The exclusionary rule's ability to develop the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures becomes
abundantly clear when one compares the Fourth Amendment's develop-
ment before and after the exclusionary rule was automatically applied.'78
Simply put, before the exclusionary rule existed, the Court rarely ad-
dressed the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and as such, Fourth
Amendment law never evolved or developed.17 9 In contrast, when the
Court automatically applied the exclusionary rule, the content of the
Fourth Amendment was thoroughly explained.18 0 Today, the Court is
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, which can partially be
attributed to the growing list of good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary
remedy.18' However, after Heien, the Court will likely use the good-faith
exception to narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment right, in addi-
tion to the remedy, which will provide enough momentum to begin a
new era where the exclusionary rule is only applied in cases with flagrant
officer conduct.'82
Indeed, the Heien Court continued the trend of applying Herring
and Davis's assessment of the reasonableness of the officer's conduct
(i.e., the good-faith exception). However, instead of admitting the evi-
dence of cocaine found in Heien's car by barring the exclusionary reme-
dy, the Court justified admitting the evidence by holding that the search
did not violate Heien's Fourth Amendment right.'83 This procedurally
different way of using the good-faith exception contracts the scope of the
Fourth Amendment's protections by causing the validity of the search or
seizure to hinge on the convoluted metaquestion of whether it is reasona-
ble for a police officer to believe the search was reasonable.'84 Notably,
none of the Justices in the majority or concurring opinions discussed the
validity of the search or the exclusionary remedy. Instead, they vaguely
navigated the scope of "objectively reasonable" mistakes.'8 5 The majori-
ty opinion ambiguously stated that "[t]he limit is that 'the mistakes must
be those of reasonable men.'" 8 6 Justice Kagan's concurring opinion
made the standard slightly more lucid when she explained that a mistake
178. See id. at 731-32.
179. Id. ("If ... violations of the Fourth Amendment are understood to result in a nearly abso-
lute and automatic application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court seemed to anticipate in Katz v.
United States, then courts adjudicating criminal cases will have no choice but to carefully and pre-
cisely articulate the content of the Fourth Amendment." (footnote omitted)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 732.
182. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 19, at 615-18 ("Taken together, Hudson, Herring, and
Davis represent a fundamental reworking of the exclusionary rule.").
183. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) ("Here, by contrast, the mistake of
law relates to the antecedent question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect that the
defendant's conduct was illegal. If so, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first
place.").
184. See id
185. Id. (emphasis omitted).
186. Id. at 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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of law is only reasonable if judges would take opposite positions on what
it says. But when the contours of the Fourth Amendment right are ar-
ticulated in the context of the officer's mistake, rather than the validity of
a search or seizure, the Court has no incentive to reach the merits of the
case.'" The Court seems to have forgotten that when it first began to
meaningfully develop the Fourth Amendment, it emphasized that reme-
dies define rights and that without the exclusionary remedy police offic-
ers have no incentive to refrain from conducting unreasonable searches
and seizures.'89
C. The Implications ofAllowing Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law
Police should not be excused from making mistakes of law because
when police become interpreters of the law, in addition to merely enforc-
ers, it undermines our criminal justice system and disserves many of our
basic rule-of-law values. Allowing police to make mistakes of law not
only creates a perverse double standard for the well-known maxim "ig-
norance of the law is no excuse," but also deprives individuals of their
physical liberty and causes police officers to violate their own sworn
duty to enforce the law.190 Indeed, Heien v. North Carolina gave the
Court an opportunity to put legal bounds on an already discretionary law
enforcement system. Instead, the Court essentially gave police officers a
license to stop individuals based on whatever subjective criteria they see
fit. As long as police officers can point to one of the numerous ambigu-
ously worded traffic codes as a legal justification, they will no longer
violate the Fourth Amendment. This endorsement of police discretion
will not only exacerbate the problem of racially charged traffic stops, but
also will threaten judicial integrity, undermine the expectation that the
law is clear and knowable, and disincentivize legislators to make laws
that are clear and concise.
1. The Expansion of Police Discretion Will Have a Disproportion-
ate Effect on Minorities
For the last half-century, courts have played an important role in
interpreting and clarifying substantive criminal laws after they have been
codified by legislatures.191 However, allowing police officers to take over
the role of interpreting substantive criminal laws signifies "a [major]
departure from this institutional arrangement."l9 2 Indeed, allowing police
187. See id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
188. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 695.
189. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ("If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion."), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
190. Logan, supra note 74, at 70.
191. Id. at 95.
192. Id.
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officers to make mistakes of law will encourage officers to interpret laws
in ways that best serve the government's crime control interests because
the only limit on their mistakes is that they must be "mistakes . . . of rea-
sonable men."'93 This endorsement of police discretion will remove any
incentive for police officers to refrain from conducting racially charged
traffic stops because they will be able to stop an individual based on any
ambiguously worded traffic code.
There is a dire need for the Court to better address the problems that
stem from racial tension between police officers and minorities. Indeed,
there is widespread agreement that the War on Drugs has exacerbated
racial profiling in the context of traffic stops and that allegations of rac-
ism remain prevalent hroughout American streets and courtrooms.194 In
just the past few months, the deaths of Levar Jones,195 Walter Scott,196
and Samuel Dubose,197 all of whom were black men that were shot by a
white police officer during a traffic stop, have illuminated that the racial
tension between minorities and law enforcement is in dire need of being
more seriously addressed. But these scenarios provide just a sampling of
the nationwide problem. According to the Justice Department's 2012
statistics, black drivers are 31% more likely to be pulled over than white
drivers,198 more than twice as likely to be subject to police searches as
white drivers, and more than twice as likely to not be given any reason
193. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); Logan, supra note 74, at 95.
194. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) ("The War on Drugs ... is a new
occasion for the employment of traditional techniques of discriminating against racial minorities.");
Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
257, 257-59 (2009) ("The costs and benefits of [the] . . . 'war on drugs' [has been] fiercely debated.
... [But there is no dispute] "that this ostensibly race-neutral effort has been waged primarily against
black Americans.").
195. A white police officer stopped Levar Jones for a seatbelt violation. Jason Hanna et al.,
Video Shows Trooper Shooting Unarmed Man, South Carolina Police Say, CNN (Sept. 26, 2014,
8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/justice/south-carolina-trooper-shooting/. When Jones
reached for his wallet, the officer thought he was reaching for his gun and shot him. See id.
196. A white police officer stopped Walter Scott because he had broken brake light. Dana
Ford, South Carolina Ex-Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN (Jun. 8, 2015, 5:30
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictment-walter-scott/. "[A] dash
cam video ... shows the two men talking before Scott gets out of the car and runs." Id. It then shows
the police officer chasing him and then shooting him. Id
197. A white police officer stopped Samuel DuBose "because his car didn't have a front li-
cense plate." Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Shooting of Samuel DuBose, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/opinion/charles-blow-the-shooting-of-samuel-
dubose.html? r-0. His body camera shows the officer taking out his gun and shooting DuBose in his
car without any provocation. Id. The officer then lied about the stop to authorities and said he was
being "dragged by the vehicle and had to fire his weapon." Id. (quoting Officer Tensing's infor-
mation report).
198. Christopher Ingraham, You Really Can Get Pulled over for Driving While Black Federal
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for the traffic stop. 199 In light of these statistics, as long as the Court con-
tinues to expand police discretion and ignore the role that the Fourth
Amendment plays in protecting people from racial profiling, 200 discrimi-
nation is unlikely to be ameliorated.
In Heien, the majority opinion explained that "[r]easonable suspi-
cion arises from . . . an officer's understanding of the relevant facts and
his understanding of the relevant law." 20 1 Applied to the facts, Sergeant
Darisse's mistaken understanding of the brake light traffic law provided
the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop and search Heien's car.20
2
However, the Court failed to acknowledge an important aspect of the
"reasonable suspicion" that began the case. Sergeant Matt Darisse was
sitting on the side of a major interstate watching cars drive by when he
noticed that a Hispanic driver, Maynor Vasquez, looked "stiff and nerv-
ous" because he was "gripping the steering wheel at a 10 and 2 position
and looking straight ahead."20 3 In other words, Vasquez was followed for
being Hispanic and driving a beat-up car in North Carolina.
Putting aside Darisse's reliance on the brake light law that led to the
Court's mistake of law discussion, it is important to note that there are so
many traffic violations that it has become "virtually impossible for a
driver to not commit an infraction."204 As such, a police officer can fol-
low a car for a short time and almost always find a reason to pull the
205
person over. Considering that minority drivers are much more likely to
be pulled over than Caucasian drivers, it is difficult to ignore the role that
206
race plays in the process.
Before Heien was decided, the Rutherford Institute20 7 attempted to
draw the Court's attention to this problem by submitting an amicus curi-
199. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR
DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1, 9, 17 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtsslL .pdf.
200. See Sherry F. Colb, Stopping a Moving Target, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 191, 204-06
(2001) (explaining that one of the evils that the Fourth Amendment was to protect against is unbri-
dled discretion of law enforcement agents).
201. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
202. See id. at 535-36.
203. Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Ignores the Lessons of Ferguson, SLATE (Dec. 16,
2014, 2:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/heien_v-northcarolinaas_
the-rest of the country worries about policeoverreach.html (quoting Officer Matt Darisse's
suppression hearing testimony).
204. Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 252 (2010).
205. Id.
206. Furthermore, in Whren v. United States, the Court held that a police officer's subjective
motivation for stopping an individual is irrelevant and that the only inquiry is whether there is prob-
able cause. 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996). Consequently, even if the police officer has unconstitu-
tional intentions for the stop, as long as he can conjure up a basis for probable cause based on a
traffic code, there is no Fourth Amendment violation. See id.
207. The Rutherford Institute is a non-profit conservative legal organization dedicated to the




ae brief thoroughly discussing how traffic stops disproportionately affect
discrete and insular minorities.20 8 The brief emphasized that the expan-
sion of police discretion as it relates to "mistakes of law will ... have the
effect of encouraging and increasing the number of legally baseless
searches."209 In other words, it gives officers a broader range of legal
justifications to hide racially charged motives. Unfortunately, Justice
Sotomayor was the only one to recognize this. In her dissent, she ex-
plained that expanding police discretion to include reasonable mistakes
of law "further erod[es] Fourth Amendment[] protection of civil liberties
in a context where that protection has already been worn down."2 10
2. Other Implications of Allowing Police to Make Mistakes of Sub-
stantive Law
The concept that the U.S. government is "a government of laws, and
211not of men" was first established by John Adams in 1780. Since then,
this principle has been repeated in dozens of Supreme Court decisions
and emphasized as an important part of guaranteeing all citizens equal
protection under the law.212 However, Heien turned this notion on its
head by defending the work of law enforcement officers, even if it eradi-
cates the protections of the fundamental rights embedded in the Fourth
Amendment. In effect, if the Fourth Amendment is controlled by "men"
and not by "law," it will threaten judicial integrity, undermine the expec-
tation that the law is "definite and knowable," and disincentivize legisla-
tors to make laws that are clear and concise.213
First, allowing police mistakes of law significantly undermines ju-
dicial authority because instead of interpreting and clarifying statutory
language, courts will instead feel the need to analyze whether the police
officer's interpretation of the law was reasonable.214 The problem with
allowing courts to resolve cases without interpreting the law is that most
cases that involve police mistakes of law arise in the context of low-level
offenses, like traffic codes, which are often worded in ambiguous ways
and are in desperate need of clarification.215 If each law enforcement
officer is able to interpret these laws in different, yet "reasonable," ways,
they will never be clarified, which burdens citizens and law enforcement
alike.2 16 This not only portrays the message that the "suggestion box" for
208. Brief of The Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 1-3,
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604).
209. Id. at 5.
210. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
211. Clifford W. Taylor, A Government of Laws, and Not of Men, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
199, 199 (2005) (quoting the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780).
212. Id.
213. See Logan, supra note 74, at 83, 95-98 (discussing the implications of police mistakes of
law on separation of powers).
214. Id. at 95-96.
215. See id. at 95-98.
216. See id.
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interpreting the law is always open, but also discourages police officers
from learning and applying the law in a consistent way. In essence, it
seriously undermines the foundational democratic principle that the law
must be "definite and knowable."2 17
The majority opinion attempted to address this problem by pointing
out that the objectively reasonable limit will provide enough of an incen-
tive for police officers to continue to learn the law.218 However, the Court
ignored the fact that even if a police officer knows the law extremely
well, he will still be able to use any ambiguous low-level offense to justi-
219fy his search. Moreover, the Court refused to acknowledge that police
departments are far from being neutral and detached arbitrators in the
judicial system, mostly because their primary goal is to appear to have a
robust system of crime control.220 Police departments are not condemned
for arresting too many criminals; however, they are condemned when
they appear to be too soft on criminals, which is a threat if police officers
always narrowly construe statutes.221 To make things worse, police offic-
ers often lack direct oversight because most are employed by county,
local, or municipal governments, which often have extremely decentral-
ized accountability.222 Simply put, allowing law enforcement officers to
assume the role of interpreters of the law will have the effect of usurping
judicial authority because courts will no longer be obliged to interpret
statutory language and clarify the law; they will merely need to decide if
the officer's interpretation was reasonable.223 In effect, vague laws will
become free tickets for police to circumvent Fourth Amendment protec-
tions and to search individuals at their discretion.
Validating police mistakes of law also undermines legislative ac-
countability because when courts eliminate application of the exclusion-
ary rule, legislators have little incentive to write laws that are clear and
concise.224 It is important to note that legislators and law enforcement
officials often work together to design policies that effectively bring the
guilty to punishment. Accordingly, courts are reluctant to intervene or
impose any substantive limits on this collective effort.225 By the same
token, courts' only significant tool for condemning Fourth Amendment
policies is through the application of the exclusionary rule.226 Thus, when
courts withhold its application, legislators have little incentive to make
clear laws because they are no longer sensitized to losing cases where
217. Id. at 83.
218. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
219. Logan, supra note 74, at 83.
220. Id. at 98.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 98-99.
223. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).






evidence has been excluded. As a result, police will have an even
broader range of unclear substantive laws, which will give them more
discretion in justifying unreasonable searches.228
CONCLUSION
Heien gives officers a legal justification to stop individuals at their
discretion and to use an ambiguous law as a free ticket to circumvent
Fourth Amendment protections. It also creates a perverse double stand-
ard for the basic tenet-ignorance of the law is no excuse-by allowing
police officers to interpret laws in ways that best serve their interests, but
requiring citizens to know and follow every law, regardless of how am-
biguous it is. But what is particularly unique about Heien is that it ex-
panded the good-faith exception in both degree and application; it limited
the factual scenarios where the Court discusses the application of the
exclusionary remedy and shifted the analysis of "objectively reasonable
mistakes" from a question of remedy to a question of right. In doing so,
Heien seriously undermined the protections that the Fourth Amendment
provides individuals. Now, the availability of the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures no longer hinges
on whether the search or seizure was reasonable, as the text of the Fourth
Amendment requires. Instead, the validity of a search or seizure turns on
the convoluted metaquestion of whether it is reasonable for a police of-
ficer to believe the search was reasonable.
Katherine Sanford
227. Id. ("When courts indulge police legal misunderstandings, especially relative to textually
uncertain laws, and withhold application of the exclusionary rule, legislators, likely politically sensi-
tized to the 'loss' of the more serious cases from which the seizures emanate, have less incentive to
avoid textual imprecision." (footnote omitted)).
228. See id.
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